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Chapter 1: Technicalities of Doubting: Temple 
Consultations and Criminal Trials in India  
 
Daniela Berti (CNRS, Centre for Himalayan Studies) 
 
 
 
 
The notion of doubt has often been addressed in anthropology 
in relation to the question of belief. Anthropologists started to question 
the relevance of using the Western category of ‘belief’ to describe the 
practices and attitudes of the people they studied, notably after the 
publication of the critical approach developed by Needham (1972). By 
underlining the association generally made between belief and 
conscience, some authors preferred to replace the notion with other 
terms less linked to the idea of individual conviction, such as 
representation (Lenclud 1990; Pouillon 1993; Hamayon 2006; 
Schlemmer 2009); others started to consider doubt and scepticism as 
crucial aspects of ritual practices that had erroneously been 
underreported in fieldwork accounts (Boyer 1990; Beatty 1999; 
Rappaport 1999).
1  
A debate parallel to that about belief then developed around the 
notion of reflexivity. In his introduction to a journal special issue, 
Højbjerg (2002) focuses on ‘reflexive attitudes’ such as doubt, 
incertitude or the ‘do as if’ adopted by people taking part in religious 
practices. Here reflexivity is intended not only in the sense that ritual 
actions are submitted to public debate among the audience or to 
diverging comments from the ritual specialists themselves. It is also 
considered as being the result of the organizational form of ritual 
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 A similar debate has developed in the field of history. Veyne (1992), for example, 
dealt with the question of belief in terms of ‘programme de vérité’. 
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action, including ritual language and the modes of transmission of 
religious ideas (Severi 2002). In other words, reflexive attitudes are 
not only part of a discursive register. They may also be devices 
completely integrated into the rules used in a specific institutional 
context of interaction.  
In line with this perspective, I deal in this chapter with 
practices of doubting in two institutional settings found in the 
Himachal Pradesh region of the Indian Himalayas, which are both 
concerned with the process of judging.
2
 My aim is not to investigate 
personal or cognitive experiences of doubting. By taking doubt as a 
matter of practice and technique, my aim is to see how doubting is 
managed and resolved in reference to decision-making processes. First 
of all I talk about temple /p. 20/ consultations during which village 
deities, through their institutional mediums, are asked to arbitrate local 
conflicts and to give their verdict on people’s misconduct. These ritual 
procedures are then compared to the ways in which the techniques of 
doubting and proving are used in Indian criminal trials as well as in 
judges’ rulings.  
Although temple mediums and judges may not appear to have 
anything in common, they do in fact share some similarities: both 
arbitrate cases, interpret or establish ‘facts’ and ‘truth’, and pronounce 
judgments and verdicts. In one case the arbitrator is a god’s medium 
who speaks on behalf of a village deity; in the other he is a 
professional judge who speaks in the name of the law.  
In both contexts – ritual and judicial – the verdict is preceded 
by processes to either quell or develop any doubt, but in ways that are 
almost totally opposite in the two cases. With regard to the deity’s 
medium, the doubt that must be expressed or removed is, above all, the 
doubt that the person consulting the deity may have about the way the 
deity interprets their problem – because this interpretation may clash 
with their perception of the facts. However, given that the deity is 
considered to already ‘know the truth’, the doubt in question concerns 
whether the medium is really speaking on behalf of the deity and not 
on his own behalf.  
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By contrast, in the case of a judicial trial, it is the judge’s doubt 
that has to be disproved or confirmed, and during the trial the lawyer 
for the accused and the prosecutor have to produce a set of evidence 
and arguments in order to either sow or remove any doubt in the 
judge’s mind. Moreover, in his final ruling, the judge’s personal 
opinion about the facts has to comply with the way the notions of 
doubt and proof are used in legal codes and judicial procedures.  
 
 
Consulting the Village God  
 
I will first present this practice of doubting and proving in the 
context of medium consultations. At the time of ritual consultations 
(deopuchna) a village deity is made part of an interactional setting 
within which its presence is enacted by its human medium (gur or 
chela).
3 The medium’s authority comes from the deity by whom he is 
supposed to have been chosen, although this divine selection has to be 
officially and publicly recognized during a special village ceremony. 
Once initiated, a medium has the duty to ‘presentify’ (Vernant 1985) 
the deity in all ritual festivals and also to hold regular consultations at 
people’s request.4 In exchange for his service as a medium he may be 
granted some tenancy rights over /p. 21/ the deity’s property or he may 
receive part of the offerings made by those who come for a 
consultation. Consulting a god is thus a highly institutionalized ritual 
context where the deity’s manifestation in the medium’s body, as well 
as the interaction which takes place between the deity and the people, 
is regulated by a series of procedures and formalized ritual techniques.  
Moreover, many of those who attend these consultations also 
feel that they have institutional links with the deity, either because they 
have received some of the god’s land in exchange for their services at 
the temple (such as musicians, priests or administrators) or simply 
because they live within the area (har) over which the deity is 
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considered to exercise its power. The multiple names people use to 
address the deity during a consultation – Maharaj (king), 
Bhagvan/Bhagvati (god/goddess) Mata (mother) or even Malik 
(landowner) – indicate the multiple registers on which the relationship 
between people and the deity is constructed. These ritual links and 
obligations have historical roots in the royal past as many of these 
deities received land donations from various kings of the region and 
were somehow considered as local rulers (Berti 2009). Their public 
role was recognized during the colonial period by the British 
administrators, who officially declared many village deities of the 
region owners of the land by recognizing the deity’s juristic 
‘personality’ (Sontheimer 1964). The legal existence of a deity 
continues to be recognized in the post-colonial state to the point that a 
god may become the main petitioner in a court case (Malik 2010; Berti 
2012a; Clementin-Ojha 2013).  
Interestingly, in a bureaucratic setting – for example before a 
judge or Deputy Commissioner – a deity is represented by the temple 
administrator since the medium plays no part in it. On the contrary, at 
village level the medium is the main means of accessing the deity.
5 
Through the medium the deity is directly questioned not only about 
settling personal or family problems but about its opinion on any major 
decision to be taken at village level.  
Disputes among villagers are regularly brought before the deity 
who is asked to pronounce judgment and to propose a compromise 
between the parties. The deity’s verdict may sometimes even take a 
form of competition with the court of law when those consulting the 
deity are involved in an ongoing court case. This judicial role of the 
deity is specified during the ritual when the medium, when speaking 
on behalf of the deity, may say ‘The court is mine, justice is mine’ 
(Berti 2012a).
6  
During the consultation, the medium, who often belongs to a 
low-status caste, is addressed as if he were the deity, and what he says 
is considered to come directly from the deity. This is true in principle, 
at least. In practice, consulting a deity always involves undertaking a 
process of doubting, which is induced by the ritual procedure. As I will 
show in the next section, mediums have recourse to various /p. 22/ 
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techniques to deal with doubt, some of which are commonly used by 
all the mediums in the region, while others are specific to a particular 
deity.  
 
 
The Presumption of Doubt: ‘Distributing Rice’  
 
In ritual consultation, the possibility that people doubt what the 
medium
7 
tells them is fully acknowledged and the ritual procedure 
includes specific techniques of contestation and verification. Some of 
these techniques are codified in the gestures that the medium performs 
at each consultation. For example, at the very beginning of the séance, 
immediately after the deity has been ritually embodied in the medium, 
the latter takes out a lock of hair from his forehead. This gesture is 
described as a kind of promise he makes to speak ‘the truth’, which 
means that he will not speak for himself; he will talk only if and when 
the deity, as people say, ‘comes’ (ata he) into his body.  
The general discourse is, in fact, that the deity’s presence in the 
medium is intermittent; it comes and goes – an idea that in itself leaves 
room for possibly doubting what the medium is saying. The gesture is 
presented as a sort of oath that the medium has to take before 
speaking: just like the judge who asks the witnesses to swear that they 
will speak the truth before the court, here the deity itself is said to ask 
its own medium to swear that he will not speak for himself, that he will 
be merely a vehicle for the deity’s speech.  
At the very beginning, before the individual consultation 
begins, the medium starts by distributing a small handful of rice to 
each of those taking part in the consultation. This is another 
systematic, codified procedure that is followed every time a 
consultation is held. The one who receives the grains must count them 
and see if there is an odd or even number. If it is an odd number, it 
means that the person is ‘of one mind’, that he does not have any 
doubts, at least at this stage. On the other hand, if it is an even number 
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it means that he has some doubt. For example, the expression ‘char 
vichar’ may be used among the audience, which means that if one has 
four grains this shows that the person has some thoughts. The person, 
or the other attendants, may then react by addressing the deity, for 
example with the following words: ‘O Maharaj! Why these thoughts? 
We don’t want any thoughts. We honour you’. In order to get rid of 
these thoughts, the person who is supposed to doubt has to throw away 
the grains and ask the medium to give him or her another handful of 
rice for as long as it takes to obtain an odd number.  
This kind of interaction shows, on the one hand, how the 
person who is consulting the deity is considered to be somehow 
unaware of the fact that he doubts /p. 23/ because the ‘thoughts’ 
(vichar) are presented as being independent of the person’s will. In 
fact it is the deity, not the person, who is asked by the audience to 
eliminate these vichar. An even number of grains of rice is in fact 
treated by people as a bad omen or as a negative presence rather than 
as indicative of the person’s mental attitude. On the other hand, the 
fact that the person has to throw the grains until he gets an odd number 
shows that the procedure of taking the grains of rice is meant not only 
‘to check’ whether the person harbours some doubts, but ‘to make’ 
him not have any.
8 
 
 
 
Interactional Doubt: ‘Giving Rice’ and ‘Ore Pogre’  
 
Once this collective process of eliminating the vichar is 
complete, interactions take place at a more individual level. The first 
person to be heard by the deity is again given a handful of rice and 
they again check the number. This giving rice and counting the grains 
may be repeated throughout the consultation, which may last some 
time, especially if the case proves to be serious.  
In some cases, during the verbal interactions, the person 
consulting the deity appears to challenge what the deity says or to 
propose a different explanation of the problem from the one proposed 
by the deity. In one particular case, for example, a woman, who was 
well-known to the medium,
9 
did not agree with what the deity was 
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7 
 
saying about her situation. She was given rice many times but it was 
always an odd number – which meant that the woman had no doubts. 
She eventually counted an even number and threw away the rice 
because that meant that she did have some doubts. The medium then 
stopped giving her rice and started reproaching her for questioning 
what he (the deity) said. This case shows how, although the rice is 
meant to check whether the person has some doubts, it may be used by 
the medium to somehow accuse the person of not telling the truth and 
of challenging the deity’s verdict.  
Another interactional form of doubting is the so-called ore 
pogre which literally means ‘round stones’ and refers to a procedure 
by which the person consulting the deity has to arrange three stones in 
the shape of a triangle on the floor. They have to mentally associate 
each stone with a possible cause of the problem. One stone may be 
associated, for example, with the idea that the person’s problem is due 
to an act of witchcraft; the second stone with the idea that what has 
happened to them is due to some punishment inflicted by a deity; and 
the third stone with the idea that the problem is due to some planetary 
movement. Once the person has made this mental association, the 
medium has to choose the stone to indicate the exact cause.  
/p. 24/ 
During the consultation, the medium may ask the person ‘to put 
ore pogre’ in different situations. He may do this when he considers 
that the person is – as the medium says – ‘in two minds’, meaning that 
he has some doubt. The request to put ore pogre appears to come from 
the deity itself and not from the medium. This is made explicit in ritual 
interactions as the person doing ore pogre continues to address the 
deity. In fact, up until the end of the consultation the possibility that 
the ‘medium’ is acting on his own behalf is never openly evoked by 
the audience. By contrast, it may be paradoxically suggested by the 
medium himself who, speaking on behalf of the deity, may say to the 
person ‘If you don’t believe my patru (‘recipient’, that is the medium), 
put ore pogre and I will tell you myself’. Although in ore pogre the 
medium has to select the stone, the procedure is presented as being 
somehow less dependent on the medium-as-a-man than the reply that 
he gives verbally during the consultation. The fact that a reply has 
been given through ore pogre is in fact referred to by people as ‘proof’ 
that the reply is ‘true’.  
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Sometimes ore pogre is recommended by the medium as a 
reaction to a person’s behaviour. For example, when the deity starts to 
say that a person’s problem is not due to any punishment, that it is 
simply due to difficult times, or to some inauspicious planets, the 
person may say ‘O Bhagvan, why don’t you want to tell me what has 
happened?’ The medium then asks the person to put ore pogre. To 
start with, the person usually refuses to do this because they do not 
want to challenge the deity. Thus, they may begin to say ‘No, deity, I 
don’t want to defy you, I don’t want any confrontation with you. Tell 
me in your own words [that is, through the medium]’. In such cases, 
people nearby may start asking the person to put ore pogre as though 
they want to convince them to accept – which the person eventually 
does.  
 
Man: We don’t want to put ore pogre.  
Medium: first of all you must put ore pogre and then I will explain to 
you and I will fulfil your request.  
Man: Eh deity, tell us with your own words, we don’t want to put ore 
pogre.  
Medium: you put ore pogre and I will tell you the outcome! Put ore 
pogre!  
Other people: You must say it like that [verbally]! (field notes, 
Jagatsukh, 1995)  
 
In some cases, the test with the three stones is a way for the 
person to check what the medium has already said to them verbally; at 
the same time it may be used by the medium to negotiate the person’s 
reply, and even to adjust or to change his initial reply as a consequence 
of the interaction he has had with the person. For example, in one case 
the medium told a woman that she was under a bad planetary influence 
(din dasha) but the woman did not like the idea of simply being 
affected /p. 25/ by a bad planet as this was not regarded as a real 
explanation for the problem. She began to cry, showing that she was 
not satisfied with the reply, so the medium told her: ‘Put ore pogre and 
satisfy your own mind. [See] if there are some bad planets or if there is 
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a bhut [ghost] sent by someone to harm you. Put ore pogre and then I 
will tell you myself!’10
  
The woman then put ore pogre and when the medium selected 
a stone, she let out a cry of joy, which implicitly indicated that the 
stone chosen was not the one with which she associated bad planets. 
The medium, speaking on behalf of the deity, then told her, ‘There is a 
bhut. Do you see now?’, and thus he changed his interpretation of the 
woman’s problem. The woman’s satisfaction was clearly evident: 
having an enemy to fight is more reassuring than believing that one’s 
problems are due to inauspicious planets where it is more difficult to 
ritually intervene.  
The fact that the interpretation of the problem may change 
during the dialogue is generally accepted. One formula frequently used 
by the medium during the consultation is ‘you’re in two minds [you 
doubt], I have seven speeches’. In other cases, however, the formula 
used by the medium is ‘one word, one weight, one balance’, by which 
the medium confirms what he – that is the deity – had previously said.  
In cases where the medium selects a stone that corresponds to a 
reply that is not what the person would have liked to hear, the reaction 
may vary: the person may think that the medium is speaking for 
himself or that the deity does not want to tell them the truth; or they 
are no longer certain about the association they had made and they 
want to repeat the procedure; or they may just say that they don’t want 
to find out through ore pogre but they want the deity to speak to them 
directly (that is, through his medium).  
It must also be said that the way in which the medium selects 
the stone may be more or less ambiguous: sometimes he touches the 
stone with the ritual bell, throwing aside the selected stone; sometimes 
he pushes away two stones with the bell, which may suggest that he 
has chosen the third stone. Finally, even if the medium selects what the 
person thinks is a good reply, the person may carry on having some 
doubts. They then have to repeat ore pogre two or three more times.  
Like other ritual contexts reported in the literature, the case of 
medium consultations analysed here shows how the expression of 
doubt is internal to the ritual logic. We have seen how, for example, it 
is by speaking as the deity that the medium requests the person to 
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express or to solve his or her doubt. In some cases this even creates a 
sort of linguistic paradox with the medium speaking as the deity who 
explicitly says to the people ‘If you do not believe my medium [patru, 
that is, recipient] then put ore pogre and I will tell you myself’. This 
shows how the ritual action not only presumes the manifestation of the 
deity, but may /p. 26/ also challenge it or be performed in order to test 
the effectiveness of the deity’s power (Severi 2002). In the context of 
the deity consultations analysed here this may even end up creating a 
kind of short circuit as, for example, when the deity, somehow 
challenging its own existence, says during the séance ‘If you honour 
me, I am a god, otherwise I am a piece of stone’.  
On the other hand, the analysis of the procedure shows how in 
the context of ritual consultations doubting does not appear to be 
related only to the question of belief. Instead, it is a way for people to 
become involved in the interpretative process and for the medium to 
reinforce his verdict or, on the contrary, to change it. It enables the 
medium as well as the person consulting the deity to adjust their 
respective interpretation and comprehension of the situation submitted 
to the consultation. Doubting in this context is in fact a creative aspect 
of the interaction, a communicative technique that leaves room for 
discussion or contestation.  
 
 
Law Courts and Criminal Proceedings  
 
I will now compare this practice of doubting in this 
institutionalized ritual setting with the one used in judicial settings (in 
the same region) and especially with the way doubt is expressed and 
formulated during a trial as well as in judges’ rulings. Unlike in ritual 
consultations, where doubt expressed during the procedure comes 
mostly from the person consulting the deity, in the case of a trial, the 
doubt that must be refuted or confirmed is doubt in the judge’s mind 
about the guilt of the accused.  
In his work on the theological roots of the criminal trial, 
Whitman (2008) argues that ‘reasonable doubt’ is to be seen as a 
vestige of a very widespread pre-modern anxiety about judging and 
punishing. The author shows how the original function of reasonable 
doubt was not, as it is today, to protect the accused, but to protect 
jurors against the potential mortal sin of convicting an innocent 
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defendant. The rule of ‘reasonable doubt’ was, he argues, a ‘technique 
of moral comfort’, aimed at protecting the judge from damnation 
(Whitman 2008: 6). Although in India the religious dangers attendant 
upon judging were mentioned in Sanskrit texts in the early centuries of 
the Common Era (Granoff 2010), by the time Western criminal 
procedures were introduced during the colonial period, they were in no 
way associated with these medieval religious concerns and were 
perceived as completely secularized techniques. Some of the practices 
adopted during colonial times, such as the jury trial, were even 
abolished soon after Independence, and the absence of the jury trial 
does not seem to have generated any particular religious anxiety about 
the judge’s salvation in the next life. The procedure followed in India 
during a trial therefore no longer has any obvious link with Christian 
or Brahmanical religious concerns, and violations of rules or offences 
are not sanctioned according to religious precepts but according to 
sections of the Civil or Penal Code (Berti 2012a).  
/p. 27/ 
As in other adversarial systems, here again the criminal trial 
takes the form of a battle between two (supposedly) equal parties: the 
prosecution, which attempts to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, 
and the defence, which seeks to undermine the prosecution’s case and 
to create reasonable doubt. As Lea (2006) notes regarding the English 
procedure, the task of the defence is not to prove the innocence of the 
defendant but to prevent the prosecution from proving their guilt.  
Unlike in the British criminal system, the trial judge in India is 
completely alone in deciding the case. The absence of a jury often 
leads the judge, the prosecutor and the lawyers to discuss technical 
points such as procedural constraints of the investigations, legal 
sections and contradictions between witnesses’ versions. The 
witnesses, especially when they are from rural areas and with no 
knowledge of English, are unable to follow interactions of this kind, 
which constantly shift from the vernacular to English. These may also 
turn out to be rather animated discussions between the judge and the 
attorneys, with one constantly interrupting the other.  
The absence of a popular jury does indeed influence the way a 
trial is performed. All interactions take place very close to the judge, 
who follows the verbal exchanges with the file in front of him. Judges 
often take an active part in the interactions by putting many questions 
to witnesses, especially when they think that the prosecutor is not 
12 
 
asking them the relevant questions. It is also through the judge that 
witnesses’ replies are put into official writing. After each interaction in 
Hindi the judge translates and dictates to the stenographer the content 
of the corresponding question-reply, and formulates the sentences in 
the first person as if the witness were actually dictating.  
This process of official transcription, which in 
cross-examination is sometimes taken over by the defence lawyer, 
includes conventional formulas which allow doubt to be expressed 
and, even more importantly, to be somehow suggested in the record. 
We will now see how, during the different stages in the case, doubt is 
expressed and solved.  
 
 
Adversarial Doubting: Hostile Witnesses and Cross-examination  
 
In Indian judicial procedures many verbal and oral techniques 
are available in order to express doubt in a codified way. One of these 
techniques is linked to the practice of declaring a witness ‘hostile’. 
This especially happens in relation to prosecution witnesses, who are 
called by the prosecutor to back the accusations. At the time of the 
trial, prosecution witnesses are asked to repeat before the judge what 
they previously stated to the police during the investigations. These 
witnesses are first questioned by the prosecutor (as well as by the 
judge) according to the rules that apply to the examination-in-chief, 
where questions are left open. However, it very often happens that the 
witnesses’ replies contradict their previous statement, the written 
version of which is included in the police report. When this happens, 
the witness is accused of not telling the truth. This follows an 
extremely /p. 28/ codified procedure which consists in dictating in 
English to the stenographer a sentence of the following kind:  
 
At this stage Learned Public Prosecutor has stated that witness is 
trying to suppress the truth. As such request is made to cross examine 
the witness, which is considered and allowed.
11 
 
 
Since the sentence is dictated in English, it is not usually 
understood by the witness who is therefore not aware that he has just 
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been ‘officially’ accused of telling a lie. However, from a procedural 
point of view, after this sentence has been dictated, the questions are 
put to the witness according to the rules that apply to cross-
-examination. He will be systematically confronted with his previous 
statement which is referred to after every question. To each question 
the witness has to reply yes or no. The content of the question is then 
transcribed and translated by adding the formula ‘It is incorrect that 
…’ or ‘I have not stated that …’ in the event where he replies no and 
‘It is correct that …’ in the case where he replies affirmatively.  
When he replies in the negative, the English transcription of the 
reply is followed by the sentence ‘Confronted with portion [reference 
to the paragraphs] of the statement … in which it is so recorded’. Long 
paragraphs of the police report may therefore be referred to in court 
records by using the negative formula ‘it is incorrect that …’ when 
quoting from it, which aims at underlining that the witness has 
changed his previous version and he is thus lying before the court.  
Let us look at an example where, during the trial, a father who 
had previously accused his daughter’s in-laws of being responsible for 
his daughter’s suicide denied ever having made this accusation:  
 
Judge: Look, her mother-in-law and her husband mistreated her. This 
is all you told the police … Did you tell the police that the accused 
was beating her?  
Man: No, I didn’t tell the police. (field notes, Shimla, 2009)  
 
The judge then dictated in English to the stenographer:  
 
It is incorrect that I stated to the police that the accused were beating 
Anjana [his daughter] or that they had ever maltreated her 
(confronted with portion A to A of mark A in which it is recorded). 
(Court file, Himachal Pradesh v. Neelam Safri & Susheel Kumar, 
2009)  
It is incorrect that my daughter complained to me that the accused 
had started treating her with cruelty nor did I make such a statement 
to the police (confronted /p. 29/ with portion B to B of statement ex 
PW 1-A in which it is so recorded). (Court file, Himachal Pradesh 
State v. Neelam Safri & Susheel Kumar, 2009)  
 
Using a negative form of transcription ‘it is incorrect that my 
daughter complained to me’, emphasizes the fact that the witness is 
14 
 
contradicting the story he had previously given to the police or that he 
is contradicting what the lawyer wants to suggest. In some cases 
lawyers make use of a double negation as in the sentence ‘It is 
incorrect to say that I was not present in the spot’ – which may 
sometimes prove rather confusing, even for the judge.  
The prosecutor’s witnesses are also cross-examined by the 
defence lawyer. In cases where they have turned hostile, the lawyer 
will simply ask them some complementary questions. This is not the 
case, however, for police witnesses, as lawyers will try to undermine 
their credibility by asking each of them very detailed questions aimed 
at getting them to make contradictions with their previous report or 
with each other’s replies. Contradiction is in fact essentially used as a 
way of casting doubt on the credibility of the witness’s story.  
As soon as the defence lawyer succeeds in throwing light on 
some discrepancies between the police replies and their past account, 
the lawyer directly dictates to the stenographer a standardized sentence 
which enables him to highlight the discrepancy. For example, in a 
narcotics case, the defence lawyer wanted to put on record that the 
time a police officer gave during the trial regarding the call he had 
received from a secret informant did not match the time he had written 
in his report. After asking the police officer to confirm that the time 
given in his reply was correct the lawyer dictated to the stenographer 
the following sentence as if the witness was speaking in the first 
person; ‘My today’s testimony is correct, whereas the time of receipt 
of secret information written in seizure memo [in the report] is 
incorrect’ (Court file, Himachal Pradesh State v. Kanshi Ram, 2010).  
This sentence is the equivalent of the formula ‘Confronted 
with’ used in the case of hostile witnesses mentioned above. By 
emphasizing the discrepancy between the current and the previous 
account the defence lawyer aims to discredit the police officer’s 
credibility in the eyes of the judge. Here, too, expressing doubt is a 
written procedure which is not even completely understood by the 
person concerned, especially those who do not speak English, who do 
not realize that their credibility has been challenged in the evidence 
report.  
Another codified procedure aimed at introducing doubt about a 
witness’s credibility is used at the end of the cross-examination and 
serves to elicit the reason why the witness would choose to support the 
accused, and thus to deny his previous statement. This is done by using 
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another written formula whose effect is to affirm the very opposite of 
what is being denied. These conclusive sentences are dictated by the 
lawyer in English to the stenographer on behalf of the witness. The 
aim is to allow the reason why the witness may be telling lies before 
the court to emerge. For example, in the case where an offence is 
committed in a village, the village president is always included among 
the prosecutor’s witnesses at the trial.  
/p. 30/ 
In all the narcotic cases I followed, both in Shimla and Mandi 
Session Courts, the village president started to contradict what he or 
she was supposed to have said during the investigation. They were 
therefore declared hostile witnesses and subjected to 
cross-examination. In one case, for example, the judge, at the end of 
the cross-examination, told the village president in Hindi:  
 
Judge: Look, you are protecting them because they are your 
supporters and you are doing this to win their votes.  
Pradhan: No, they are not my supporters and I am telling the truth. 
(field notes, Shimla, 2010)  
 
The judge then dictated in English to the stenographer:  
 
It is incorrect that I [the village president] am suppressing the truth 
because the accused backed me in the elections (Court file, Himachal 
Pradesh State v. Kanshi Ram, 2010)  
 
As in the other case mentioned above, the negative form is 
used here to suggest what is apparently being denied, that the village 
president is suppressing the truth.  
Reference to the electoral link between the accused and the 
witness is a very typical way of concluding a hearing with a village 
president. It is a standard formula added at the end of the court 
interaction to implicitly suggest that the witness is telling a lie and to 
give the reason for this. In fact, most of the time the judge and the 
prosecutor know that as well as winning the votes of the accused the 
village president has received money from them. Yet, the ‘electoral 
reason’ is a conventional form of recording the fact that a village 
president has turned hostile.  
Another common formula used when a fellow villager of the 
accused turns hostile to the prosecutor points to the links which 
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supposedly exist between those belonging to the same village. For 
example, in a rape case (Himachal Pradesh State v. Devinder Sharma, 
2010), the formula dictated at the end of the cross-examination was ‘It 
is incorrect to say that I belong to the same village of the accused and 
that for this reason I am telling a lie’ (Court file). In fact, this sentence 
does indeed suggest that the witness is telling a lie and that he is 
supporting the accused because he belongs to the same village. In 
another similar case the formula used was ‘It is incorrect that I have 
received consideration from the accused and that for that reason I am 
telling a lie’ (Court file), which suggests that the witness may have 
received some money or some compensation from the party of the 
accused in return for testifying in his favour.  
This kind of conclusive sentence is also used by the defence 
lawyer, especially at the end of the cross-examination of police 
witnesses.
12  
For example, in the /p. 31/ narcotics case mentioned 
above the defence lawyer wanted to put on record that the police 
officers had invented a false story against the accused and that the case 
had not been registered in the way they described in their report. At the 
end of the cross-examination he dictated to the stenographer the 
following sentence directly in English:  
 
It is wrong to suggest that the case has been planted upon the accused 
by the police. It is incorrect that I am deposing falsely (Court file, 
Himachal Pradesh State v. Devinder Sharma, 2010)  
 
This final sentence is frequently added at the end of the 
police’s cross-examination by the defence lawyer, to infer that the 
police officer is in fact telling a lie.  
These sentences are aimed at providing the lawyer’s version of 
the story through the witness’s denial of what he appears to be stating. 
This is a conventional form of recording cross-examination: it enables 
the lawyer to suggest his version without leaving the accused the 
chance to react in any way. In fact this kind of sentence may even be 
dictated by the judge or the lawyer even though the witness has not 
actually been questioned.  
                                                          
12
 In fact, as independent witnesses frequently turn hostile the defence lawyer has no 
reason to contradict them. By contrast, police officers are often submitted to long 
cross-examination by the lawyer. 
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As the examples above show, the content of these 
counter-stories is quite vague and points to some standardized idea 
such as village corporatism or, on the contrary, the existence of a 
personal enmity between the accused and the witness. Though 
conventional, these strategic counterarguments are expected to be 
found in the file. While in strong cases they may be completely 
ignored by the judge and considered to be merely the defence’s 
discourse, in cases that are not entirely proven they will be used by the 
judge as additional arguments to conclude that the case has not been 
proven beyond reasonable doubt (that the doubt has not been lifted).  
Although this procedure of recording slows down the trial, it 
provides a written transcription of witnesses’ testimonies which will be 
referred to in the successive phases of the trial. Passages from these 
transcriptions will be read aloud by the lawyer or prosecutor during the 
arguments and will be quoted by the judge in his written order. They 
will also be used much later, when the case is examined at the appeal 
Court many years after the verdict. Here the appeal judge will rely 
entirely on these transcriptions to evaluate the case. However, unlike 
in the trial situation, where the witnesses’ appearance, their attitudes 
and their replies enable the judge to evaluate the truthfulness of their 
words, the appeal Court can only rely on the information recorded in 
the file by the trial judge.  
 
 
The Percentage of Doubt: The Notion of ‘Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt’  
 
Contrary to these interactional and strategic techniques for 
introducing doubt into the court file, reference to the notion of doubt is 
explicitly made by judges in the /p. 32/ judgments they have to write 
up after a hearing. Here the legal notion of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
is often used by the judge to argue his final decision. Although often 
presented as the highest ‘standard of proof’ the notion of ‘reasonable 
doubt’ is not explicitly defined in legal codes of procedure (Whitman 
2008) and judges often use it by making reference to a rather general 
meaning (or discourse) as found in other judgments, especially from 
appeal courts.  
High Court judges in Shimla were also puzzled when I asked 
them to tell me the meaning of this notion. They found the question 
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very pertinent and started not only to discuss it with their colleagues 
but also to raise the question in court. The way in which the notion of 
‘reasonable doubt’ is used in judgments may in fact vary from one 
judge to another. Let us compare, for example, two judgments passed 
by two session judges.  
The following passage is taken from a judgment concerning a 
narcotics case. The judge, who was known in the Shimla court milieu 
as an open-minded and non-convicting judge, addressed this issue as 
follows:  
 
The prosecution is bound to stand on its own legs and to prove the 
case beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the nature of the 
punishment provided for by the commission of alleged offences, 
standard of proof is also required to be much higher and case set-up 
is required to be proved in a mathematical manner and beyond any 
reasonable doubt. (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay and others, 
2007)  
 
This may be compared to the judgment of another judge of the 
Mandi Session Court, who was a close friend of the previous judge, 
but had more traditional views and was known as a ‘convicting judge’.  
 
It is now fairly settled that there can hardly be a case with cast iron 
perfections in all respects … The court should not extend 
exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt or lingering 
suspicion. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better 
to let a hundred guilty persons escape than punish an innocent 
person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt constitutes a guideline and 
vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. (State of 
Himachal Pradesh v. Setu Devi, 2004)  
 
A High Court judge from Himachal Pradesh, who was well 
known for being very progressive and open-minded, considered the 
first passage as a ‘regressive’ kind of reasoning. ‘This is what the law 
was twenty years back’, he told me, ‘but the law evolves … we cannot 
forget that witnesses in India can be bought. If independent witnesses 
turn hostile or if there are minor contradictions, this is not a reason to 
acquit the accused’. He noted how the notion of ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ has been subjected to historical transformations of the 
perception of proof. According to him, whereas twenty years ago the 
19 
 
general attitude of judges was to make a ruling only if they were 
100 per cent sure that the accused had committed the /p. 33/ offence, 
today most judges ‘pass judgment even if they are only 90 per cent or 
80 per cent sure’, depending on the judge. He also noted how the 
percentage of doubt that leads a judge to decide one way or another 
may sometimes depend on the time that has passed since the first 
sentence, especially when they have to return a verdict to acquit the 
accused. He gave me as an example a rape case where the accused had 
been acquitted twenty years earlier by the trial court and for which he 
now had to examine the appeal. The judge thought that the decision to 
acquit the accused was wrong and he strongly reproached most of his 
colleagues for not taking the rape case seriously. However, in the case 
in question, he finally decided to dismiss the appeal. He explained: 
‘The accused has now married and has a daughter who is almost my 
daughter’s age. If after twenty years I put him behind bars his wife 
would be miserable and his daughter too’. He added, however, that he 
would no doubt have convicted the man if it had been a case of 
murder.  
The experience and the consequence of doubting are probably 
not the same for a Session judge (who conducts the trial) and an appeal 
Court judge. Unlike the appeal judge, who can merely rely on the court 
file or on the lawyer’s statements, the doubt the trial judge has may 
increase or diminish after the judge has directly interacted with the 
witnesses and the accused. However, the kind of personal or intuitive 
opinion the judge has during the trial may sometimes be different from 
what he decides in his verdict because his decision must be based on 
the evidence that has been put on record during the hearings.
13 
For 
example, in a rape case tried in Shimla court, during out-of-court 
discussions the judge appeared to be convinced that the victim, a 
nine-year-old girl from a Scheduled caste, had been raped by the 
accused, a Brahman boy, son of the girl’s landlord. This could also be 
deduced during the hearings when, on behalf of the prosecutor, the 
judge on many occasions dictated the formula suggesting that the 
prosecution witnesses, who had turned hostile in favour of the accused, 
were telling a lie because they had received compensation from the 
                                                          
13
 In such cases, the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial judge sometimes 
appears to be in contradiction to the attitude he may have towards the prosecution 
witnesses at the time of the trial (accusing them of not telling the truth and of turning 
hostile). 
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party of the accused. In spite of this personal opinion and of the fact 
that other witnesses, including the schoolteacher, supported the 
prosecutor, he decided to acquit the accused. He wrote in the 
judgment:  
 
Confronted with the evidence discussed, finding recorded and law 
cited supra, this court is left with no option except to hold and 
conclude that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. (Court file, Himachal Pradesh State v. 
Devinder Sharma, 2010)  
 
He explained to me that, even when he thinks that the accused 
is guilty, he is strictly bound by the evidence required by state law. In 
this case, for example, even if important prosecution witnesses, such as 
the girl’s teacher, had testified against /p. 34/ the accused, the fact that 
the victim and her mother denied the offence transformed the other 
versions into ‘hearsay’.  
In cases like this where the judge considers that there are 
obstacles to convicting the accused, the notion of ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ might be used by the judge in a rhetorical way, as a catch-all 
notion automatically invoked to justify the decision of an acquittal. 
Here the presence of doubt is often associated with the ‘chain of 
evidence theory’ frequently used by judges in their written decisions. 
What follows is a short passage of a Supreme Court judgment referring 
to this idea of ‘chain of evidence’ in a High Court decision:  
 
There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any 
reasonable grounds for the conclusion consistent with the innocence 
of the accused and must show that in all human probability that the 
act must have been done by the accused. (Sharad Birdhi Chand 
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 17 July 1984)  
 
As in the case of the mathematical certainty mentioned above 
by the Shimla judge, the ‘chain of evidence theory’ is played down by 
some judges who consider it possible to convict the accused even if 
some minor links in the chain are missing. The reasonable doubt that 
may prevent the judge from convicting a man may therefore vary 
depending on a multiplicity of factors which lead judges to present this 
notion as a ‘doctrine’ rather than as a personal or cognitive experience. 
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As A.C. Dogra, a former session judge who at the time of my 
fieldwork was Law Secretary in the Himachal government, told me: 
  
Each judge has his own approach to evaluating the evidence; that’s 
why in a given case you find that the trial court will acquit the 
accused and then the High Court will convict the person. People may 
say that the trial judge has not assessed the evidence properly, that he 
overplayed the contradictions in the evidence. Now, the appreciation 
of circumstantial evidence depends on the judge’s mindset. 
(Interview, Shimla 2011)  
 
The technical rather than psychological nature of doubting 
emerges in the way a judge may try to elude – at least partly – an 
element of doubt in order to convict the accused. Let us take an 
example. In 2012 during a criminal appeal at Himachal Pradesh High 
Court, a two-judge bench overturned a ruling to acquit the accused that 
had been pronounced by a trial court in 2004 concerning a case where 
the two accused, a man and his mother, had been charged 
simultaneously under section 372 (murder) and section 498a 
(harassment). They were accused of having harassed their respective 
wife and daughter-in-law by insisting that she bring a larger dowry, of 
having finally killed the woman and of staging the murder as a suicide.  
This theory was backed by the medical report according to which the 
cause of death was ante-mortem internal injuries, not hanging. It was 
also backed by the victim’s family who had testified before the court 
regarding the dowry demands. However, a suicide note had allegedly 
been found by the husband, which said that /p. 35/ none of her family 
should be held responsible for her suicide. This note, which a 
laboratory had certified as having been written by the victim, had led 
the trial judge to acquit the accused by giving them the benefit of the 
doubt. However, the appeal judges who, as one of them told me, were 
‘convinced that it was a case of murder’ thought up a way of getting 
around what they admitted to be an element of doubt – the suicide note 
– by affirming that the woman had committed suicide as a result of the 
harassment inflicted on her by her husband and mother-in-law. They 
thus convicted the accused not of murder but of harassment and 
abetment to suicide. The way one of the judges on the bench explained 
their decision to me shows the reasoning process behind their decision:  
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To be honest, if the suicide note was not there we would have sent 
them down for murder. Both of us were convinced in our minds that 
it was murder but what was standing in our way was the suicide note 
she had written. In fact, it may also be that the doctor had not done 
his job properly … Now when there is a doubt, when a suicide note 
exists … If there is a suicide note it cannot be murder. My brother 
(the other judge of his bench) and I, we kept discussing this matter. 
We discussed it many times. It took us two weeks to deliver the 
judgment, which is unusual in my court. So I said, OK [let it be 
murder], but we won’t let them both get off scot-free. In the ruling 
we have come to the conclusion that it was not murder but suicide, 
and that the note was written under coercion. As there was also a 
case about dowry demands, we got them for a dowry death, which is 
seven years whatever the provision … You see, these are cases 
where we have to think a lot. We thought that if we sentenced them 
for murder and then the suicide note worked at the Supreme Court 
[that is if the suicide note was again taken as an element of doubt] 
then they would be acquitted even for dowry death because no one 
will raise that issue there, so we thought it better to opt for a lesser 
crime. This is the way we work.
14 
 
 
The example shows how in this case the element of doubt, far 
from being a state of mind, was a technical obstacle for the judges 
which had to be strategically overcome. It also shows how judges may, 
in difficult cases, twist the case away from what they personally 
understand, when they are uncertain about how their decision is going 
to be received at the next level.  
This kind of strategy that aims to find an alternative solution in 
order to convict the accused, even when there are technical obstacles 
to proving the offence, is not specific only to the court. The 
conversations I had with various state legal officers reveal a system 
that shows a similar attempt to sidestep the question of proof. 
According to this system, all serious criminal cases punishable by 
more than seven or ten years’ imprisonment and which result in an 
acquittal by the /p. 36/ Session Court are almost systematically sent to 
the appeal Court. As one senior advocate General in Shimla explained 
to me:  
 
                                                          
14
 For information, the judge told me that both the accused were eventually acquitted 
by the Supreme Court. 
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When I worked at the Law Department we received from the 
prosecutor’s office so many files that we didn’t have time to examine 
them in detail. So we used to simply say that a file had not been 
properly examined by the court … In a criminal appeal it is very easy 
to prepare one or two pages on these grounds to file an appeal to the 
High Court instead of examining the case in detail. (Interview, 
Shimla, 2011)  
 
This routinization of the appeal process seems to have less to 
do, here again, with a mental attitude than with a form of ‘procedural 
doubt’ where doubting appears to be integrated into the procedure 
itself.
15 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
In both contexts of judgment, doubt not only has to be resolved 
through the (ritual or judicial) procedure: it first has to be produced 
and made explicit. In both cases, the process of doubting appears less 
as a cognitive attitude than as a technical device completely integrated 
into the procedural rules which may be used both as a communication 
strategy and as a space for producing or imposing contrasting points of 
view. Although in ritual consultations doubting is presented as coming 
from the person who has to be judged (not from the judge, as in the 
case of a trial), in both cases doubt is first and foremost a technique 
controlled by ritual or legal professionals.  
In ritual consultations, management of the ‘verification 
techniques’ (rice distribution, ore pogre) is a way for the person to 
become involved in the interpretative process and for the medium to 
reinforce the authority of his verdict. The technical character of doubt 
appears even more clearly in the context of criminal trials where 
                                                          
15
 Behind this systematic recourse to appeal, there is also a problem of 
accountability, with every officer leaving the decision to the next officer. In fact, 
when a criminal case ends in an acquittal, the file of the case starts its journey 
through various offices where people have to give their opinion on whether the case 
should be sent for appeal. For serious offences, where the sentence is more than 
seven or ten years’ imprisonment, the file is sent from the Home Department to the 
Law Secretary and then to the office that deals with criminal cases. In the event that 
an appeal is recommended, the file is sent to the Advocate General who represents 
the state at the High Court. 
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casting doubt on the witnesses’ credibility is part of the fighting spirit 
common to the adversarial procedure. Here the techniques of doubting 
(cross-examination, strategic use of the negative/affirmative in 
dictation) are very much aimed at casting doubt on what the witness is 
saying and on their credibility. Most of these techniques are not even 
understood by the person on whom doubt is cast /p. 37/ because they 
are pronounced in English and dictated directly to the stenographer. 
This therefore constitutes codified doubt, which is recorded in the file 
and is likely to be effective later on – when the (trial or appeal) judge 
has to write his decision.  
Compared to these strategic and interactional techniques of 
doubting, the notion of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ referred to by 
judges in their decisions may appear to rely on the judge’s personal 
conscience. However, even this notion which is common to all 
adversarial systems seems rather far from the idea of an ‘emotionally 
disrupting experience of doubting’ as is often described in relation to 
the French idea of ‘intime conviction’, which allows the judge (and the 
jurors) to pronounce a person ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ (Bouillier, this 
volume). As the expression may somehow suggest, ‘reasonable’ doubt 
lays emphasis on a more weighted, rational attitude which appears to 
be far from the ‘disquiet and uncertainty’ experienced by French jurors 
who, in a ‘contemplative silence’ and ‘searching for the truth deep 
down within themselves’, are eventually and suddenly ‘invaded by an 
intime conviction’ (Cuer 2011). In comparison, ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’, at least in the way it is used in India, appears to be the 
consequence of an application of formal rules, which the judge may 
use independently  from and even in contradiction with his ‘intime 
conviction’. 
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